The rapid diffusion of medical technologies is widely recognized as a key driver of healthcare cost escalation. The excessive duplication of technologies gives rise to the so-called medical arms race. Conventional wisdom tends to explain this phenomenon by external reimbursement mechanisms and hospitals' competitive strategies, but has largely neglected the role played by health regulations that may also affect hospitals' technology adoption decisions. This study sheds new light on the medical arms race with evidence from China, which has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of big tertiary hospitals and a keen pursuit of expensive medical technologies. Chinese hospitals aggressively pursue high-tech medical equipment as an opportunistic reaction to the peculiar health regulatory environment. By analysing a panel dataset collected from Shenzhen City, this study reveals a series of important impacts of the medical arms race in Chinese public hospitals. High-tech medical equipment is found to lead to an increase in hospital revenues and patient volumes, but no significant impact is noted on unit costs. While high-tech medical equipment is associated with a discernible improvement in clinical outcomes, no contribution to hospitals' operational efficiency is noted. These findings are interpreted in the context of the broader health regulatory framework and China's public hospital reforms.
Introduction
The adoption and diffusion of medical technologies have been widely recognized as a major driver of the global escalation of healthcare costs (Okunade and Murthy, 2002) . While technological innovations have undoubtedly improved the quality of care, they have also heightened the financial strains on health systems (Smith et al., 2009) . Newhouse (1992) suggests that in the five decades preceding 1990, half of health spending in the USA was attributable to new technologies. Barros (1998) estimates that technological change may explain at least 30% of health expenditure growth in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The so-called medical arms race has been observed in many systems where excessive duplication of expensive medical technologies and services creates enormous waste, supplier-induced demands and rapid cost inflation (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Cooper et al., 2011) . When coupled with perverse economic incentives, the medical arms race may get even more intractable, not only fuelling a steep escalation in costs but also raising serious ethical issues (Hillman and Goldsmith, 2010) .
Most previous studies tend to attribute hospitals' keen adoption of new technologies to their competitive strategy in the healthcare market (Devers et al., 2003; Berenson et al., 2006) as well as to economic incentives created by the external funding environment, such as health insurance (Romeo et al., 1984; Chou et al., 2004) . In the USA, e.g., the introduction and penetration of managed care were found to have slowed down the diffusion of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) equipment (Baker and Wheeler, 1998) , mammography facilities (Baker and Brown, 1999) and an even broader collection of advanced medical technologies (Mas and Seinfeld, 2008) , arguably in response to the cost-saving incentives embedded in managed care.
Despite the received wisdom on the determinants and effects of the medical arms race, two research gaps are notable. First, while market structure and reimbursement mechanisms are certainly crucial factors leading to the aggressive acquisition of technologies, adequate attention has not been paid to the role of regulation (Selder, 2005) . Given the sheer budget required, the purchase of expensive equipment is subject to government regulation in many health systems. Therefore, the regulatory environment may drastically alter hospitals' economic incentives, which, in turn, will affect their technology acquisition and utilization decisions (Bech et al., 2009 ). Second, most previous studies were predominantly focused on the West, especially the USA, with very little knowledge gained elsewhere. The structural differences in healthcare delivery and regulatory environment may complicate the causal dynamics. Therefore, the medical arms race may be the result of many distinct contextual factors.
This study aims to advance the existing knowledge on the medical arms race by examining the case of China, which has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of big tertiary hospitals and a zealous pursuit of state-of-the-art medical technologies in the past decade (Yip and Hsiao, 2014) . What is the role played by health regulation in the medical arms race in China? Is the adoption of medical technologies a good strategy for hospitals to maximize their interests? What is its actual impact of such a strategy on various aspects of hospital operation? This study attempts to answer these research questions with secondary data collected from a city-level investigation. It illustrates that Chinese hospitals' competition for high-tech medical equipment partially results from a peculiar regulatory environment in which essential resources are subject to varying degrees of government regulation. The loopholes within the regulatory framework enable profit-minded hospitals to purchase high-tech equipment to maximize revenues. This medical arms race impedes the efforts to build a reasonably structured delivery system and creates duplication and enormous waste in large tertiary hospitals. In China's ongoing healthcare reform, policy attention should be paid to tweaking the health regulatory regime that is able to curb excess capacity of large hospitals.
Background
Under the old communist planned economy, public hospitals, the key providers in the Chinese health system, were run and financed by the state through regular subsidies and government-organized insurance programmes (Ma et al., 2008) . In China's marketization reforms that commenced in the 1980s, financial support from the government drastically dwindled, while most insurance programmes were either dismantled or significantly weakened (Hsiao, 1995) . On average, government subsidies account for merely 10% of hospitals' revenue, leaving the vast shortfall to be filled by user fees. Hospitals are allowed to earn revenues from drug sales and service charges.
The government-regulated fee schedule sets prices for basic drugs and procedures below marginal costs but overprices high-tech diagnostic tests such as computerized tomography (CT) and MRI scans (Liu et al., 2000) . This distorted fee schedule, coupled with the domination of fee-for-service in paying providers, powerfully motivated Chinese hospitals and physicians to overprescribe pharmaceuticals and high-tech diagnostic tests (Eggleston and Yip, 2004; Yip et al., 2010) . Staff incomes were linked to revenue generation indicators, compounding the overprescription and administration of unnecessary procedures (Qian and He, 2018) .
This skewed incentive regime has paralleled the dramatic expansion of public hospitals in China. In contrast, primary care facilities are significantly underutilized, in part owing to patients' distrust about their medical standards (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011 ). China's health delivery system has thus been characterized by a big tertiary sector and a weak primary care foundation, despite laudable progress in strengthening the latter in recent years (Liu et al., 2015) . In the absence of a functioning gate-keeping system, many Chinese patients are inclined to visit public hospitals instead of private hospitals or clinics, even for minor conditions (Eggleston et al., 2008; Wu and Lam, 2016) .
Since virtually all hospitals are self-financing facilities, their financial interest lies in keeping rather than referring patients elsewhere, even when a referral is clinically necessary (Yip and Hsiao, 2014) . As such, patients continue to flood into big hospitals, which have developed a strong motivation to expand their capacity because that enables them to earn even more revenues. Between 1980 and 2010, the annual growth rate of the number of hospitals in China was 2.5%. There was also a 3.7-fold increase in the number of 'very large hospitals' (>800 beds) from 149 to 588 between 2000 and 2009 (Barber et al., 2014) . Sixty-six giant hospitals are each equipped with at least 3000 beds (Kanyijie, 2018) .
Three elements are central to the expansion of hospitals: personnel (especially physicians), infrastructure (especially hospital beds) and medical equipment. Bech et al. (2009) highlight an important but often neglected trade-off between the regulation of hospitals' physical capacity and their technology use. A similar regulatory trade-off also exists between the control of pharmaceutical use and technology adoption, suggesting the well-known cost-shifting strategies of hospitals. The aforementioned study inspired us to examine how the regulatory arrangements affect the medical arms race in the Chinese context.
The Chinese hospital system manifests a peculiar mix of both tight regulation and laissez-faire policy. On the one hand, the government's health bureaucracy has weak financial leverage to control the behaviours of public hospitals given its small contribution to their incomes (Hsiao, 2007) . With limited policy tools, the health bureaucracy often has to resort to ad hoc administrative mandates or moral exhortations that generate a temporary effect at the most (He and Qian, 2013) . In reality, hospital managers have considerable operational autonomy but limited checks and balances on them
Key Messages
• China has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of big tertiary hospitals and aggressive pursuit of expensive medical technologies.
• Driven by hospitals' profit incentives, this fierce medical arms race is also an opportunistic reaction to China's peculiar health regulatory environment.
• The empirical evidence derived from Shenzhen City suggests mixed outcomes of the race, but raises grave implications for health planning and regulation.
from other stakeholders (Yang, 2016) . On the other hand, regulation is tightly exercised on some crucial aspects of hospital operation (Allen et al., 2014) . The three elements aforementioned are subject to varying degrees of regulation in China. First, the employment of full-time medical professionals in Chinese public hospitals is subject to rigid civil service rules. The headcount is tightly controlled by the Institutional Organization Office (bianzhi bangongshi) of each level of government, over which even the health administration has little say (Eggleston et al., 2008) . The actual recruitment of medical staff is administered by local personnel authorities. Hospital managers have very limited autonomy over hiring or firing decisions, even when some staff members do not perform (Eggleston et al., 2008; Yip and Hsiao, 2014) . A severe shortage of nurses also plagues Chinese hospitals (Anand et al., 2008) . In reality, hospital managers may overcome this manpower constraint by hiring part-time staff or full-time staff without permanent status. In other words, the regulatory constraint on personnel may not be as rigid as it appears on document.
Second, infrastructural expansion of public hospitals is subject to regional health planning enacted by local governments. This administrative binding plan specifies key parameters, including the populationto-hospital-bed ratio in a locality in a given period (typically 5-10 years). Major infrastructure projects must obtain approval from the local planning commission (fa gai wei). However, in reality, considerable leeway exists where ambitious hospital managers may push the envelope. Many local governments also tend to turn a blind eye towards large projects as long as the hospital is able to finance them (World Bank, 2016; Yang, 2016) . Unfortunately, many similar aggressive projects result in excessive borrowing and a high debt-asset ratio paralysing hospitals' finance (Hu and Cai, 2014) . In recent years, the Chinese government has significantly tightened up the regulation on the physical expansion of public hospitals, making it increasingly difficult to expand the number of hospital beds (National Commission of Health and Family Planning, 2015; World Bank, 2016) .
Third, constrained by the above regulations, investing in medical equipment could be a substitute expansionary strategy to increase a hospital's capacity. Public hospitals' acquisition of major medical equipment has been governed by a central government regulation enacted in 2005. This Chinese version of the certificate of needs system classifies medical equipment into Category A (unit price !5 million RMB) and Category B (unit price <5 million RMB). The acquisition of Category A equipment must be considered by provincial health bureaus in accordance with their respective regional plans and quota given by the National Health Commission, while citylevel health bureaus may grant approval to acquisition applications for Category B equipment. In reality, its decentralized way of enforcement has created considerable loopholes, within which hospitals may manoeuvre (World Bank, 2016; Yang, 2016) . Most important, given the regulation of physical and personnel expansion, purchasing high-tech medical equipment has become a possible and convenient way of expansion. In recent years, the Chinese government has introduced a series of measures to curb the notorious drug price inflation (such as the termination of the 15% drug profit margin and the introduction of the National Essential Medicines System), which has had a marked effect in drug cost reduction (Song et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2015) . Ironically, this has in fact made diagnostic equipment of even greater strategic value for the financial interest of hospitals. New evidence suggests increased diagnostic expenditures as hospitals have further speeded up the utilization of their CT and MRI scanners (Fu et al., 2018) .
In 2005 alone, China imported US$60 billion worth of medical equipment, accounting for >6% of large hospitals' fixed assets.
From 2002 to 2005, the number of MRI machines and CT scanners increased by 90.2% and 55.4%, respectively (Ma et al., 2008) . A study in 2013 indicated that in four Chinese provinces, the number of CT and MRI scanners increased by 50% from 2006 to 2009 . According to the Chinese government, from 2010 to 2015, the total medical equipment value of all hospitals rose from 320 to 629 billion RMB, representing a doubling in expenditure (Liu et al., 2017) . However, enormous wastes are created by overprescribing diagnostic tests. A study has reported that 17% of CT requisitions and 27% of MRI requisitions were found to be inappropriate and could not be justified (Li et al., 2005) .The rapid acquisition of new technologies has been further accelerated by the aggressive move of foreign medical device companies into the lucrative Chinese market. Possibilities for rent seeking in the acquisition of high-tech equipment have further fuelled the medical arms race. Corruption scandals are frequently reported in the mass media (The Economic Observer, 2015).
Conceptual framework and research hypotheses
As the famous Roemer's law states, hospital beds that are built tend to be used (Shain and Roemer, 1959) . The same logic applies to medical technologies: new equipment that is purchased tends to be used. This is especially so when the prevalent incentives encourage over-utilization. In the Chinese hospital system, the low salary of physicians, the overpriced high-tech diagnostic tests and the fee-forservice payment mechanisms combine to create powerful incentives for physicians to overprescribe these services (Liu et al., 2017) .
The empirical analysis of this study is guided by a framework that incorporates both the hospital's perspective and the patient's perspective. Hospitals adopt new technologies to serve their own interests: increasing efficiency, attracting patients and generating revenues (Devers et al., 2003) . The scramble to adopt medical technologies could be considered as a 'non-price' strategy for hospitals to remain competitive in the healthcare market (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Yip et al., 2010) . High-tech medical equipment is often understood as a signal for the quality of hospitals, and patients are likely to seek care in a high-quality hospital with a good reputation (Robinson and Luft, 1985) . Hence, hospitals have strong incentives to invest in high-tech medical equipment because both patient volume and hospital revenue are likely to increase. In the meantime, since technology adoption may be an opportunistic response to regulatory constraints on personnel and physical expansion, we attempt to analyse the nuanced interaction among these strategies. The patient's perspective is also essential since their welfare is most directly affected by clinical behaviours and the monetary costs of the medical arms race are ultimately paid by them. Therefore, we pose the following hypotheses for empirical testing:
Hypothesis 1a: Hospital inpatient/outpatient revenue is increased with the value of high-tech medical equipment.
Hypothesis 1b: Hospital drug sales revenue/diagnosis revenue is increased with the value of high-tech medical equipment.
Hypothesis 1c: Increased high-tech medical equipment value is associated with increased service volume for both inpatient and outpatient care.
A related hypothesis would be that the effectiveness of increasing investment in medical technologies increases alongside other dimensions of hospital capacity, especially the number of beds and physicians. In other words, investing in medical equipment may complement other strategies to increase hospitals' financial interests. Under the Chinese context of bed and personnel regulation, this trend may be more nuanced, so we test the following hypothesis using the same outcomes from hypotheses 1a and 1b but adding in interaction terms:
Hypothesis 1d: The effect of investing in high-tech medical equipment is increased with hospital capacity (i.e. hospital beds and personnel).
We are also concerned with the cost implications of the medical arms race. In particular, does the adoption of new technologies increase patients' financial burden? We thus propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Increased high-tech medical equipment value is associated with higher inpatient/outpatient patient bills.
We assume that the adoption of new medical technologies improves a hospital's operational efficiency and clinical outcomes through higher diagnostic accuracy and better treatment outcomes (Hurlen et al., 2010) . We take two commonly used indicators in the Chinese health statistical reporting system to represent operational efficiency: bed turnover rate and length of stay (LOS). Hospitals may benefit from new technologies through accelerated patient turnover that increases efficiency. Clinical outcomes are equally important since patients are the ultimate purchasers of service and their wellbeing should be considered. Two other commonly used indicators are used as proxy of clinical outcomes: improvement rate (of clinical condition) and death rate in a hospital. We, therefore, propose two more research hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Bed turnover rate of a hospital is increased and length of stay is decreased with increased value of high-tech medical equipment.
Hypothesis 4: Patients' improvement rate in a hospital is increased and death rate is decreased with increased value of high-tech medical equipment.
Methodology
This study is set in the city of Shenzhen in China's prosperous Guangdong Province. As the first 'special economic zone' (SEZ) in the country, Shenzhen has pioneered China's economic reforms. It is now one of the fastest growing cities in the world and home to giant high-technology companies such as Tencent and Huawei. Shenzhen has a robust healthcare system, with a total of 134 hospitals equipped with 38 124 beds, 29 300 licenced physicians and 34 065 nurses (Shenzhen Statistical Bureau, 2017) . It is observed that in China, the density of medical technologies is closely associated with the economic status of a locality . Therefore, given Shenzhen's wealth and growing demand for quality care from the large middle-and upper-income classes, we expect that investment in cutting-edge medical technologies would be more pronounced in this city. For example, between 2007 and 2015, the number of MRI systems jumped from 32 to 61 in Shenzhen, and their monetary value almost tripled (see Figure 1 ). Shenzhen's density (per million people) of MRI systems is even greater than that of Shanghai in 2009 (3.5 vs 3.2; . These characteristics make Shenzhen an interesting case study to assess the effects of technology adoption in hospitals.
Data are collected from the Shenzhen Health Statistical Yearbook spanning the years between 2007 and 2014 (i.e. 8 years in total). All public hospitals are required to report-on a yearly basis-the total value of any 'major medical equipment' with a unit price of one million RMB or above. This data source enables us to calculate the total monetary value of high-tech medical equipment in all public hospitals as an indication of their possession of new technologies. The panel nature of this dataset allows us to trace any new acquisition of medical equipment, and this longitudinal trend is able to capture the 'race' to medical arms. Our sample comprises all 80 public hospitals in Shenzhen. The revenue and expenditure related variables are deflated by the consumer price index to capture the price changes. We estimate the following model:
where y i;t refers to the outcomes of hospital i in year t. The outcomes include financial outcomes, such as revenues earned from diagnostic test, drugs and medical services for both inpatient and outpatient care. To show the relative changes of revenue, we transform the monetary variables by using the logarithm of those variables. The estimated coefficient in the results thus reflects the marginal effect of the changes of the outcome variables in percentage terms. Measurements for cost (such as patient bill sizes), operational efficiency (LOS and bed turnover rate) and clinical outcomes (improvement rate and death rate) are also considered as outcomes. b ; c; q; and d are the parameters for the corresponding variables in the model. Covariates in the model are represented by X i;t , including the number of physicians and nurses (under full-time permanent contract) as well as the number of beds in a hospital. These variables measure the capacity of a hospital in providing services. A dummy variable for large hospitals is also added. A medical institution with 500 beds or above is considered as a 'large hospital', according to the central government guideline on health resource planning that was promulgated in 2015.
1 In practice, health resource planning regulations are typically set based on the number of beds. l i denotes hospital-specific effects that we control for. x t corresponds to the year dummy variable, while e i;t is the error term in the model. In the analysis, it is possible that investing in high-tech medical equipment is a substitute for or complement to other strategies to increase hospital capacity. To account for this possibility, we test the interaction of equipment with other capacity indicators (i.e. number of beds for inpatient services and number of physicians for outpatient services) in the regression. In the model, EquipmentValue i;t thus refers to the value of the high-tech equipment in hospital i in year t. lnðEquipmentValue i;t Þ Ã Beds i;t is the interaction term between beds and total equipment value. If investing in medical equipment is a substitute for/complement to expanding hospital beds, the marginal effect of this interaction term will offset/enhance the marginal effect of hospital beds. All the regression models used in this study control for hospital-level fixed effect to address omitted variable bias at the hospital level. In the data analysis, effects from attributes of hospitals such as hospital levels are addressed by adding the hospital dummy. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the dataset. The key independent variable-total value of a hospital's major medical equipment-varies from RMB1.2 million to more than 590 million (US$1%RMB6.63). Other resources also exhibit high variation across hospitals: the number of physicians and nurses varies from a dozen to more than 1000, and the number of hospital beds varies from 30 to more than 20 000. Utilization rates also vary, with the number of outpatient visits ranging from 18 000 to more than 3.5 million per year. The same pattern is noted for inpatient admissions, which range from 700 to 222 000.
Results

Hospital revenue
Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the impact of total equipment value on revenues for outpatient and inpatient services, respectively. In Table 3 , Column (1) reveals a statistically significant association between diagnostic revenue and equipment value for outpatient services. A 1% increase in equipment value is associated with an increase in $0.31% in diagnostic test revenue for outpatient services. Column (2) suggests that equipment value remains significant, with a smaller yet still high magnitude (0.20%) for drug sales revenue. Column (3) shows that equipment value also serves as a very powerful predictor for hospitals' outpatient service revenues. In all the models (1-3), the number of physicians is not statistically significant and positive. Interestingly, the interaction term between the number of physicians and equipment value is negative and significant in Column (3). This result suggests that investing on high-tech medical equipment and increasing the number of physicians are likely to be substitute rather than complementary strategies for hospitals to increase outpatient revenues. Yet, the coefficient of the interaction term in Column (3) is marginally significant. The total number of licenced physicians in a hospital of the year 100 Nurses
The total number of registered nurses in a hospital of the year 100 Bed
The total number of inpatient beds in a hospital of the year 100 In-bill Average cost per inpatient admission in a hospital of the year RMB Out-bill Average cost per outpatient visit in a hospital of the year RMB Large hospital Hospitals with 500 beds or more Dummy Table 4 presents the effect of total equipment value on hospitals' inpatient care revenues. The positive effect of equipment value on hospital revenue appears similar for inpatient care vis-à -vis outpatient care. Column (1) shows that a 1% increase in equipment value is associated with a 0.32% increase in diagnostic test revenue. In other words, high-tech equipment plays an even bigger role in revenue generation in the inpatient division, arguably because of the more frequent tests during hospitalization. The equipment value is also positively and significantly associated with the inpatient service revenue in Column (3). There is no significant difference between large hospitals and other hospitals in terms of generating inpatient revenues by procuring high-tech medical equipment. The number of beds is significantly and positively associated with all the revenue indicators, suggesting that increasing the number of beds could be a very important strategy to earn inpatient revenues for hospitals.
Interestingly, the interaction term between hospital beds and total equipment value yields a negative significant coefficient in all inpatient revenue categories [Columns (1)-(3)], suggesting that while both the number of beds and the value of equipment are positive and significant determinants of inpatient revenues, increasing the former and investing in the latter are substitute rather than complementary strategies for revenue generation as far as inpatient divisions are concerned.
Patient volume and medical bills
In Table 5 , we investigate how total equipment value is associated with size of the bill paid by patients and examine whether there is an actual increase in patient volumes. Column (1) and Column (2) Clustered robust standard error at hospital level in parentheses; *P< 0.1, ***P< 0.01, 'large hospital' denotes hospitals with 500 beds or more. suggest that a 1% increase in total equipment value is associated with a 0.12% increase in inpatient service volume and a 0.21% increase in outpatient service volume, respectively. Yet, a 1% increase in equipment value has no effect on inpatient or outpatient bill sizes [Columns (3) and (4)]. There is no significant difference between large hospitals and other hospitals in the effect of equipment value in service volume or bill size. Importantly, Column (1) reveals that the interactive effect between hospital beds and equipment value is negative and significant. This is consistent with the results presented above that increasing the number of beds and investing in high-tech equipment are substitute rather than complementary strategies for expansion-minded hospitals. However, in Columns (2) and (4), neither the number of physicians nor the interaction between physicians and equipment value are statistically significant, implying that the regulatory constraints in personnel may not be rigidly binding in reality.
Operational efficiency
Moving on to operational efficiency indicators, Table 6 suggests that different from the case in generating revenue, investing in medical equipment does not accelerate the bed turnover rate or reduce LOS for inpatient services. The equipment effect is insignificant in both Columns (1) and (2). It is obvious that the number of beds is significant in improving the bed turnover rate (i.e. negative sign). However, the interaction term between the number of beds and total equipment value offsets the effect of the number of beds, which once again reinforces our finding that investing in high-tech medical equipment is a substitute for other hospital expansion strategies, such as increasing beds. This result may be interpreted as follows: in their keen pursuit of revenues, hospitals are able to offset infrastructural constraints by employing high-tech equipment rather than by improving their operational efficiency.
Interestingly, the statistical result suggests that the bed turnover rate is slightly decreased (with statistical significance) in large hospitals rather than in small hospitals [Column (1)]. It seems that hospitals' operational efficiency marginally declines in this case. In small hospitals, high-tech equipment may facilitate the treatment process as they tend to have a smaller number of patients in severe conditions. However, after upgrading medical technologies, the case-mix in large hospitals could change as more severe cases may be treated. We must acknowledge that both the local health administration and social health insurance agency usually impose control on a hospital's standard LOS and, therefore, the results presented here may be complicated, subject to alternative interpretation. Table 6 also presents the impact of equipment value on clinical outcomes measured by in-hospital improvement rate and death rate. Apparently, increasing the number of beds can improve the clinical outcomes [lower death rate in Column (4)]. The effect of total Table 5 . Regression result: inpatient and outpatient bill sizes and volume, and total equipment value Clustered robust standard error at hospital level in parentheses; *P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01, 'large hospital' denotes hospitals with 500 beds or more. Clustered robust standard error at hospital level in parentheses; *P< 0.1, **P< 0.05, ***P< 0.01, 'large hospital' denotes hospitals with 500 beds or more.
Clinical outcomes
equipment value is significantly negative in death rate [0.47% in Column (4)]. Interestingly, in large hospitals, the equipment value is negatively associated with the improvement rate. As suggested above, this result could be interpreted as that the case-mix in large hospitals may change as more severe cases may be treated after upgrading medical technologies. A patient's in-hospital health outcome is a complex function of many clinical and non-clinical factors that cannot simply be explained by the utilization of medical technologies, especially when these technologies are mostly diagnostic equipment. But nevertheless, the statistical results still reveal a discernible positive effect in this regard. Again, echoing the results shown above, the interaction term between the number of beds and equipment value offsets the effect of the number of beds for both indexes shown in Columns (3) and (4).
Summary of empirical results and robustness check
On the basis of the statistical results presented above, Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c are well supported. High-tech medical equipment indeed contributes a great deal to hospital revenues and patient volumes in both inpatient and outpatient settings. Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Increasing investment in medical equipment produces no significant impact on bill size. Hypothesis 1d is not supported, revealing more nuanced effects of the medical arms race. Increasing the number of hospital beds and investing in medical equipment are substitute rather than complementary strategies for generating revenue. In other words, investing in high-tech medical equipment may offset some effects of expanding hospitals' infrastructural capacity. Hypothesis 3 is not supported either. Investment in medical technologies does not lead to improved operational efficiency of hospitals. Hypothesis 4 is partially supported in the sense that investment in high-tech medical equipment does make some positive contribution to patients' clinical outcomes in terms of reducing the death rate.
Several other major healthcare reforms were introduced in China's public hospital system in the past years that might have complicated the results presented in our study. The most significant intervention was the zero mark-up policy that has been implemented since 2012 in all public hospitals in Shenzhen. This intervention has removed the 15% profit margin of pharmaceutical products dispensed in hospitals that used to constitute a substantive proportion of hospitals' revenues. Because the change in drug profit may affect hospitals' operational behaviours, we thus performed an additional robustness check by controlling the effect of equipment value in post-2012 (including 2012) on revenue-related dependent variables ( Table 7) . The results are consistent with the patterns reported in Table 4 . Moreover, the result suggests that the equipment effect is not significantly different before and after 2012, further corroborating our findings.
Discussion
The medical arms race and its effects have been studied extensively in the Western context, but little work has been done in Asia. In China, given the unique setting of regulatory constraints on both personnel and infrastructure for capacity expansion, one less regulated avenue for hospital competition has been to aggressively invest in medical technologies. Despite the desirability of technological advancement in healthcare, its actual utilization must consider a broader set of factors given the various associated risks, especially cost explosion. The race to state-of-the-art medical technologies is not solely driven by material incentives but is also explained by the regulatory framework and its enforcement in a health system. The case of China offers an excellent example to examine this medical arms race because Chinese public hospitals operate in a peculiar regulatory environment under which personnel, infrastructure and equipment-three essential medical sources-are subject to varying degrees of regulation. Therefore, a quantitative analysis is able to analyse not only the effect of technology adoption but also its interaction with other aspects of hospital capacity.
The empirical results reported above lead us to several crucial issues warranting further discussion. First, our empirical results underscore the viability of technology adoption as a method to earn revenue for hospitals. Given that local governments in China provide little subsidization for public hospitals, acquiring and utilizing more cutting-edge technologies is an effective way to compensate for this financial shortfall. Contrary to what one might expect, the acquisition of high-tech equipment has not led to discernible increase in average inpatient or outpatient costs, as far as our sample in Shenzhen is concerned. Contrary to what we had expected, this study has found no significant evidence that hospitals over-use these new technologies which may escalate unit cost. This paradoxical finding might be explained by two reasons. First, the operational strategy of hospitals in Shenzhen seems to rely on higher patient volume rather than increasing unit cost, for the purpose of revenue generation. This result echoes the findings in the West that technology investment mainly acts as a non-price quality indicator to attract patients (Noether, 1988) . The second possibility results from other interventions that are exogenous to our study design. For instance, the selective introduction of case-mix payment may alter hospitals' strategies in utilizing certain technologies, which have, in turn, compounded our statistical results. Yet, this possibility could not be substantiated due to data unavailability. In short, the exact impact of technology adoption on medical costs may present more nuanced patterns that require closer scrutiny.
Second, as explained earlier on, the medical arms race is, in part, a rational response of profit-seeking hospitals to regulated infrastructural expansion. This empirical study endorses this nuanced substitutive effect because the investment in high-tech medical equipment reduces the marginal effect of the number of hospital beds. In other words, to some degree, the medical arms race could be understood as resulting from an undersupply of hospital beds. This potentially leads to the saturation of technology and the oversupply of services such as MRI and CT Yip and Hsiao, 2014) .
Third, despite the evidence that medical arms race may-to a certain extent-improve clinical outcomes, hospitals' operational efficiency is not significantly improved by the acquisition of more valuable equipment. This reveals a tricky situation: While new technologies may have contributed to clinical outcomes through higher diagnostic accuracy and better treatment effects, these positive effects have not been translated into reduced LOS or faster bed turnover, as might be expected. One plausible explanation is that the prevalent incentive structure still essentially encourages hospitals-even major tertiary hospitals-to keep patients in rather than refer them out. Even when a discharge is clinically necessary, or is mandated by the health administration (or social health insurance agency) due to LOS control, hospitals in reality may still circumvent by readmitting the same patient. When this explanation is in effect, it defeats the desired positive contribution of new medical technologies.
Concluding remarks
Analysing a secondary dataset collected from the city of Shenzhen, this study has examined the wide adoption of medical technologies in Chinese public hospitals and its effects. We argue that despite some positive effects, this medical arms race must be understood in the broader health policy perspective. This race is made possible by the loopholes in the regulatory framework in which profit-driven and expansion-minded hospitals navigate to generate revenues through over-utilization of medical technologies, especially expensive diagnostic services.
Several useful policy implications are in order. First, the weak regulatory enforcement of medical technology acquisition has provided possible room for opportunistic behaviours. Fortunately, the Chinese government seems to be increasingly alert to this problem. A laudable policy move has been the enactment of a new regulation governing the purchase of expensive equipment (National Health Commission, 2018) . Provincial health authorities have been granted with considerable autonomy in the planning and approval of acquisition. Given the poor record of enforcement of similar policies in the past decade, bona fide enforcement must be exercised should the new regulation wish to avoid another failure and effectively prevent the oversaturation of medical technology.
Second, the tricky interaction among the various regulations governing personnel, infrastructure and equipment illustrates the poor coordination of the regulatory framework which has essentially made hospitals' opportunistic behaviours possible. Health policy makers must recognize the complexities and possible interactions in the regulatory regime and take an incentive-compatible view in its design (Qian, 2015) . Specifically, regulations with regard to various types of medical resources must be compatible and provide a coherent set of incentives to hospitals.
Third, one possible long-term solution to this chronic problem is a move away from fee-for-service in paying providers. Alternative payment methods, such as capitation and case-mix, have been experimented with in many localities and have produced largely positive outcomes (Gao et al., 2014) . These prospective payment methods are associated with in-built cost containment incentives and may be more effective in curbing hospitals' desire to join the medical arms race.
This study is certainly not without limitations. First, the findings are all associative and the pathways are not clearly defined, and so some speculation has been introduced as to the means by which increased investment in medical technology affects the outcomes. Second, the sample size only covers public hospitals in Shenzhen, an affluent SEZ that may not be representative of most Chinese cities. Therefore, we acknowledge a modest ambition of generalizability. Third, we assume that the investment in medical technology means that these services will be utilized or over-utilized, which may not always be true. Last, there may still be a couple of imperfections in measurement. For instance, the data on physicians and nurses may not include those staff hired with non-permanent status. The operationalization of a hospital's operational efficiency into LOS or bed turnover rate may also be subject to debate. While the use of secondary hospital-level administrative data is fairly common in health policy studies, the possibility of inaccurate reporting could not be completely ruled out. Therefore, the results of this study should be interpreted with caution.
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